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Abstract
This study contrasts well established liquidity measures, namely volume-based turnover ratio, related price-impact Amihud (2002) construct and the multidimensional Liu (2006) indicator alongside the Lesmond, Ogden and Trzcinka (1999) proportion of zero daily returns metric in explaining bid-ask spread plus commissions costs.  We control for six critical firm governance characteristics that impact liquidity alongside the market-based controls that are conventionally solely included in the literature.  Using a unique sample of 12 Sub Saharan African (SSA) equity markets, namely Kenya, Mauritius, Zambia, Zimbabwe, Botswana, Malawi, Namibia, Nigeria, Ghana, BRVM (Cote d’Ivoire), and then South Africa’s ALT-x and Main boards we find evidence that state and foreign venture capitalist involvement in firms enhances liquidity while involvement of foreign partners, entrepreneurial founders, domestic venture capital and inclusion within an extended business or family network has opposite effect.  The evidence supports the use of the proportion of daily zero returns measure in preference to other measures in capturing illiquidity.  Furthermore we find that liquidity is closely associated with three of six World Bank Governance measures of institutional quality with these being government effectiveness, regulatory quality and rule of law.
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- Unique comparative study of low-frequency liquidity measures in Sub Saharan Africa
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The worldwide trend in liberalising and deregulating capital markets over last two decades has led to the recent establishment and proliferation of equity markets in developing regions not typically associated with external markets-based finance such as Sub Saharan Africa (SSA) (Bekeart and Harvey, 1995).  However the negligible participation of investors in SSA equity markets, albeit with the prominent exception of South Africa, (Hearn and Piesse, 2009) the extreme variations in macro-institutional quality (Kodongo and Ojah, 2011), and the significant inter and intra-market segmentation (Hearn (2012); Hearn and Piesse (2012)) all underscore the timely need to study the efficacy of liquidity measures in capturing transactions costs within this region.
	The majority of the literature relating to the efficacy of various selected liquidity measures in capturing the dynamics of equity market transactions costs is focussed on the developed US equity markets (see Goyenko et al (2009) and Fong et al (2011) for extended discussion).  Far fewer studies focus on the efficacy of an even narrower range of liquidity indicators within the context of emerging markets with the most prominent being Lesmond (2005), Bekeart et al (2007) and Ghysels and Cherkaoui (2003).  The first two employ samples of 23 and 18 emerging markets respectively, while only 4 African markets (Egypt, Morocco, South Africa and Zimbabwe) are included in former and only Zimbabwe is in the latter.  The final Ghysels and Cherkaoui (2003) study is focussed solely on Morocco and in particular questions the applicability of the majority of liquidity estimators, developed in deep, well regulated US equity markets, on smaller emerging and frontier markets characterised by thin trading and significant segmentation.  The significant inter and intra-equity market segmentation across SSA region is reflected in the law of one price rarely holding (Hearn and Piesse, 2012), the lack of any discernible informational efficiency (Alagidede and Panagiotidis, 2009), and the inability in forming a comprehensive SSA regional market universe (Hearn, 2012).  This alone is perhaps the single most important issue underscoring the omission from consideration of liquidity measures based on variants of capital asset pricing model (such as effective spread of Lesmond, Ogden and Trzcinka (1999), henceforth LOT (1999) and price-impact measure of Pastor and Stambaugh (2003)).  Furthermore the severity of thin trading with trades in smaller frontier markets being consummated after an order matching process lasting up to weeks and months (Oliveira, 2007) obviates the omission of the majority of price-impact indicators such as more sophisticated variants of Amihud (2002) measure (documented in Goyenko et al (2009)) and the Amivest indicator owing to their being undefined for substantial periods of any sample period.  As such we modify and extend the study of Lesmond (2005) on 23 emerging markets that assesses at firm-level the effective spread measures of LOT (1999) and Roll (1984) alongside the price-impact indicator of Amihud (2002) and ubiquitous turnover ratio in explaining quoted bid-ask spread.  While we retain the quoted bid-ask spread as liquidity benchmark, this is related to liquidity measures more applicable to the extremes of thin trading and activity encountered in smaller emerging and frontier SSA equity markets.  These are the recently developed trading speed measure of Liu (2006) that captures the multidimensional nature of liquidity and is thus beneficial in application within extremes of thin trading, the ubiquitous turnover ratio and Amihud (2002) price-impact indicator​[1]​, in line with the Lesmond (2005) study, alongside the proportion of daily zero returns (over a trading month) developed in LOT (1999).  This latter measure is particularly beneficial in smaller emerging and frontier markets where the complete lack of participation of traders is more akin to a “freezing” of activity process documented by O’Hara and Easley (2010) in conjunction to the recent 2007/8 global financial crisis.  This “freezing” is attributed to high levels of uncertainty associated with a lack of familiarity with African asset classes and market-microstructure alongside macroeconomic and political instability that renders traders unable to effectively rank respective diversification opportunities in terms of utility which in turn leads to incomplete preferences causing their abstaining from trades (Bewley (2002); O’Hara (2003)).  Finally in terms of our sample and the lack of bid-ask spread data reduces the number of SSA markets from twenty to twelve:  South Africa’s main board and ALT-x markets, Namibia, Botswana, Zimbabwe, Zambia, Malawi, Mauritius, Kenya, Nigeria, Ghana and the Francophone West African regional exchange, the BRVM​[2]​ in Cote d’Ivoire.  This forms our first contribution to the literature.
	A major limitation of the liquidity literature is the sole focus on assessment of efficacy of various liquidity measures in capturing the dynamics of equity market transactions costs without reference to ownership or alternative governance systems (see for example Goyenko et al (2009); Fong et al (2011), Bekeart et al (2007) and Lesmond (2005)).  This limitation is also evident in a separate strand of literature relating different types of institutional and block-holder ownership to liquidity and price discovery process.  While Jacoby and Zheng (2010) find evidence that ownership dispersion is closely linked to enhanced liquidity and reduction in quoted spreads, similar evidence is found by Rubin (2007) where a higher number of institutional with shareholdings is linked to greater liquidity in contrast to the opposite effect arising from fewer institutions that have more concentrated ownership (see Heflin and Shaw (2000) for similar findings).  However this relates primarily to different types of owner, namely insider or institutional, and the level of competition facilitating incorporation of information into stock prices.  In contrast Rhee and Wang (2009) find evidence that foreign investors in Indonesia are more likely to have preferential access to asymmetric information and are thus related to decrease in liquidity.  Ng et al (2011) elaborate on this relationship in finding evidence of a differential impact on a stocks informational asymmetry between foreign direct investors (FDI) and their portfolio investor counterparts.  The former increases asymmetry while the latter has opposite effect.  Finally Agrawal (2011) finds evidence that institutional investor characteristics, such as risk aversion and investment time horizon, influence levels of informational asymmetry and liquidity.  However a shortfall in this literature is a lack of more comprehensive consideration of broader ownership entities and powerful alternative governance mechanisms such as affiliation to extended family networks or business groups.  Consideration of the impact on liquidity arising from broader categories of owner-entity and governance is especially important within the context of developing countries where many stock exchanges have been established with the intended goals to promote managerial efficiencies, enable state divestment from former state owned enterprises (SOEs) and facilitate access to external capital by founding-entrepreneurs that are key to economic growth.  As such we consider the impact on liquidity spreads from six ownership and governance entities, namely involvement of state, long-term foreign partner, founding-entrepreneur, as well as domestic and foreign venture capitalists alongside whether the firm is affiliated to a wider extended family or business group network.  These are all characterised by simple dummy (1/0) variables.  Therefore, the second contribution to the literature is the inclusion of firm level governance characteristics in the estimation.
	The final contribution of this paper is to consider the impact of institutional quality on liquidity (and associated illiquidity) transactions costs across a range of institutional environments in SSA.  The well established and comprehensive index measures developed by the World Bank (World Bank Governance, 2012) to capture corruption control, government effectiveness, political stability and absence from terrorism, regulatory quality, rule of law and democratic voice and accountability are also included.
	The data are a sample of 45,694 monthly bid-ask spread estimates for stocks listed on our sample of twelve SSA equity markets.  There is a considerable dispersion in liquidity costs from the South African main board (9.00%) to the ALT-x development board (33.89%) where the latter was established to facilitate funding to smaller entrepreneurial firms.  However, other major differences are the level of foreign ownership following privatisation and the presence of extended family groups and business networks.  These are both negligible in both South African markets but extensive elsewhere in SSA.  Extended family groups are especially common in Mauritius, where they dominate the market, and to a lesser extent in Nigeria, while business networks are common in Zimbabwe and Kenya.  In general, liquidity-based transactions costs are reduced where there are high levels of state and foreign venture capital involvement, while the opposite is true where there is participation by foreign partners, domestic venture capitalists, membership of extended family group/ business network and entrepreneurial founders.
	Results show that the LOT (1999) daily return measure is a better determinant of total trading costs than either turnover or the Liu (2006) construct.​[3]​  However, all liquidity measures are weakly associated with trading costs compared with models that include the liquidity controls plus firm governance measures, suggesting the importance of institutions in liquidity studies.  Nevertheless, in cases of severe illiquidity and extreme of price rigidity the simple daily zero returns measure is preferable to more complex liquidity constructs.
	To determine the impact of the six World Bank governance institutional quality measures on each of the liquidity (and illiquidity) constructs a sample of 106 annual values are used.  Four firm-specific liquidity controls from Stoll (2000) are included:  price, traded volume, daily return volatility and market capitalization.  Finally, six firm governance controls are included:  state ownership, foreign partner, entrepreneur-founder on the board, membership of extended family group/ business network, and domestic as opposed to foreign venture capital involvement.
	The results show that while turnover-based transactions costs are sensitive to all six institutional quality measures, bid-ask spreads are only sensitive to corruption control, government effectiveness, political stability and absence from terrorism, and rule of law.  However, using the new zero returns metric, transactions costs are highly sensitive to corruption control, regulatory quality and democratic voice and accountability, where the last is an indication of information disclosure.  This confirms the link between the ability of traders to participate in markets due to less uncertainly over the true value of individual assets compared to other investment opportunities and the benefits that follow from low levels of corruption and freedom from regulatory capture by social elites.  Consequently, development policy focussing on external financial markets should focus on initiating reforms to improve the informational environment of firms and hence attract more trading activity.
The paper is structured as follows.  Section 2 introduces the literature on liquidity measures and their construction, the firm governance controls and briefly defines the institutional quality indices.  Section 3 describes the data, including any limitations and presents some preliminary analysis.  The empirical methods are outlined in Section 4 following by the results and discussion in Section 5.  The final section concludes.

2.  liquidity measurement and Determinants
2.1  Liquidity benchmark:  The bid ask spread plus brokerage commission costs
The bid-ask spread is the average of the available monthly quotes with a minimum of a single month’s quote for that month and the average used for the spread, which minimizes outliers that result from monthly sampling.  Finally, following Lesmond (2005) negative bid-ask spreads and those that exceed 80% are removed.  The monthly quoted spread is defined as:
			(1)
To estimate the total trading transaction costs, the costs associated with a round trade are added on to the quoted spread for each month.  Brokerage and Exchange fees are calculated from the fee schedules detailed in Appendix Table 1.  When a percentage commission fee is not provided the maximum fixed cost is applied to the aggregate daily traded value data.

2.2  Liquidity measures
LOT (1999) Proportion of zero daily returns measure
The proportion of daily zero returns over a period of the total number of trading days in a month is based on the measure introduced by Lesmond, Ogden and Trzcinka (1999), or LOT (1999).  It is calculated on a stock-by-stock basis using:
								(2)
where  is the number of days in the month, M.

Turnover
The ubiquitous monthly turnover measure is defined as:
							(3)
where  is the number of days in the month, M.  It should be noted that there is considerable variation on an intra-market basis reflecting differences in both liquidity and turnover for many firms within each market.  Any turnover statistics that exceed 100% of the shares outstanding in any month are removed.

Liu (2006) measure
This follows Liu (2006) and is defined as LMx which is the standardized turnover-adjusted number of zero daily trading volumes over the prior x months (x = 1, 6, 12), that is:
 =  + 
										(4)
where x_month_turnover is the turnover over the prior x months, calculated as the sum of the daily turnover over the prior x months, daily turnover is the ratio of the number of shares traded on a day to the number of shares outstanding at the end of the day, NoTD is the total number of trading days in the market over the prior x months, and Deflator is chosen such that,
									(5)
for all sample stocks​[4]​.  Given the turnover adjustment (the second term in brackets in (4)), two stocks with the same integer number of zero daily trading volumes can be distinguished: the one with the larger turnover is more liquid.  Thus the turnover adjustment acts as a tie-breaker when sorting stocks based on the number of zero daily trading volumes over the prior x months.  Because the number of trading days can vary from 15 to 23, multiplication by the factor (21x/ NoTD) standardizes the number of trading days in a month to 21, which makes the liquidity measure comparable over time.  LM1 can be interpreted as the turnover-adjusted number of zero daily trading volumes over the prior month.  The liquidity measure, LMx is calculated at the end of each month for each individual stock based on daily data.

Amihud (2002) measure
The Amihud price-impact measure is defined as:
							(6)
where  is the number of days in the month, M, and |Rt| is the positive modulus of daily stock returns. Pricet and Volumet are the daily stock closing prices and traded volumes respectively.  The daily security prices are scanned for data errors, omissions and delistings.  Following the procedure outlined in Lesmond (2005) the prices are used calculate daily returns.  To control for return outliers, a data error filter eliminates daily prices that are +/- 50% of the prior day’s price and that day’s price as well as previous day’s price are deleted from the sample.  Equally if zero volume occurs on day t, then that day is deleted from average.  Finally the measure is multiplied by 106 as undertaken in Amihud (2002) in order to provide a common representation of measures and facilitate comparison.

2.2  Firm Governance characteristics in the SSA business environment
We introduce six dummy (1/0) controls to capture the impact on equity market transactions costs, represented by quoted bid-ask spread, arising from distinctive types of ownership and governance arrangements.  These are the involvement of state or related government agencies, a long-term foreign partner, the maintained presence of an entrepreneur-founder on the board, the involvement of domestic or foreign venture capital and finally whether firm is affiliated to the extended network of family or business group.  The employment of dummy controls mitigates concerns over potential endogeneity relationship between level of actual ownership by various entities and liquidity or spreads.  Equally their employment is necessitated by often erratic availability of annual reports (see African Financials (2012)) as well as considerable variation in the quality of reporting ownership across national regulatory regimes (Hearn, 2013).

State involvement
Perotti (1995) discussed the role of the state within the context of privatization noting that governments with investor-friendly policies will seek to retain part ownership as opposed to a full divestment.  It is notable that this pattern of gradual privatisation has been particularly prevalent across SSA however a particular peculiarity to French (and to lesser extent Portuguese) civil code law countries is the dirigiste (state-led) capitalist model of development (Lavelle (2001); Hearn (2013)).  This when combined with civil code legal, political and governance systems that promote central authority of state and executive are also more commonly associated with full divestment of state ownership to a strategic foreign partner (Hearn (2012, 2013)) which is more prevalent in privatizations in civil code as opposed to common law markets.  A longer term state participation signals a degree of protection and a lower likelihood of potential expropriation to minority investors which in turn is likely to be reflected in lower informational asymmetry and reduced adverse selection.  Thus, continued state involvement is expected to be reflected in higher liquidity.

Foreign partner involvement
Much of the literature on foreign ownership impact on liquidity focusses on the private information advantage of these investors that increases in accordance to the size of their holding (see Heflin and Shaw (2000); Jiang et al (2011); Rhee and Wang (2009) for example).  However Ng et al (2011) find evidence that the heterogeneity of foreign investors, with contrast made between foreign portfolio (FPI) as opposed to direct investment (FDI), is important in liquidity levels.  Building on this perspective and drawing on the management literature for foreign direct investment there is considerable evidence documenting the majority control vested over indigenous enterprises by foreign partners in order to reduce transactions costs, and enhance negotiating rights and control over cash flows of venture (Kogut, 1988).  This is also reflected in elevated ownership stakes (Sun et al, 2010; Liu et al, 2011) which in turn underscores their considerable influence and control over private information inferring elevated asymmetric information.  As such theory accords this high level of adverse selection and asymmetric information to higher spreads quoted by market makers and decreasing liquidity.

Owner-founder on the board
The literature on the impact for minority outsider investors where the owner-founder is retained on the board is also largely divided.  One strand argues that the benefits arising from human capital (Audretsch et al, 2009) as well as social capital through a nexus of relationships and social ties that are based on the founder enhance shareholder value and lead to increasing liquidity.  However, other authors such as Jensen and Meckling (1976) suggest that owner-founders are best placed to reap maximum reward from the non-pecuniary benefits of the firm at minority shareholders expense.  This latter perspective of enhanced motivation for expropriation by dominant entrepreneurial founder insiders fits more generally with the evidence regarding the reduction on liquidity caused by greater concentration of insider ownership (see Rubin (2007) and Agarwal (2011) for more discussion on this issue).  As such we adopt this latter theoretically informed view in expecting the maintained presence of entrepreneurial founder to be associated with lower liquidity.

Family/ Business group membership
We draw heavily on the management literature where the presence of extended family groups and business networks, within which both individual firms and inter-related networks of firms are bound together by common altruistic motives are especially prevalent in markets with poor quality institutions (Almeida and Wolfenzon, 2006).  In such markets transactions costs tend to be high and this is a barrier to external finance.  Lubatkin et al (2007) outline a typology of five types of altruism in family firms although not all have a positive signal for external minority investors.  Similarly, Claessens et al (1999, 2000) states that the separation of ownership of cash flow rights from voting control in extended family groups and business networks may lead to expropriation of minority outsider shareholders.  Family and business network control is frequently a function of pyramidal ownership, cross-shareholding and common board membership (see Claessens et al (2000) with respect to East Asia).  Figures 1 and 2 provide examples of family and business networks using the case of the Espitalier Noël family in Mauritius and the Press Corporation in Malawi, which is controlled by the presidency.  These examples outline the complexity in tracing the ultimate control of firms where there are extensive family or business groups.
Figures 1 and 2

As such the value of private information is likely to be especially great in firms affiliated to business groups and extended family networks with a consequential impact on elevated adverse selection and asymmetric information.  In line with evidence from finance literature (see Rubin (2007) and Agarwal (2011) for example) regarding impact on liquidity arising from a more generic classification of insiders it is expected that affiliation to an extended family network or business group is negatively associated with liquidity.

Domestic and Foreign Venture Capital
In contrast to the evidence from finance literature generally relating increasing foreign ownership with reduced liquidity (see Ng et al (2011); Jiang et al (2011); Rhee and Wang (2009) for example) the multiple agency framework advanced by Arthurs et al (2008) in the management literature promotes a different theoretical perspective on venture capital and insiders.  Venture capitalists can reduce potential agency costs that may arise between minority outsider investors and insider groups (Bruton et al, 2010).  However, their value is closely tied to the investment time horizons of domestic as opposed to foreign venture capitalists.  In particular, domestic venture capitalists are likely to have ties to the domestic market and be influenced by political motivations whereas foreign funders are more likely to exit an investment should management fail to realise shareholder value.  Thus, it is expected that domestic venture capitalists are negatively associated with liquidity and the opposite the case for foreign venture capitalists.

2.3  Institutional Determinants of Liquidity
A further limitation of multi-country liquidity research is the limited consideration of institutional quality and thus the well established World Bank Governance measures (World Bank Governance, 2012) are included.  These are: democratic voice and accountability, effective government, control of corruption, political stability and absence from conflict, regulatory quality and rule of law.  While Eleswarapu and Venkataraman (2006) do elaborate on the importance of institutional impact on liquidity and earlier study by Lesmond (2005) is limited in effectiveness as when institutional determinants of liquidity are explored then these are commonly drawn from different sources and constructed in different ways.  As such these six indicators provide a more comprehensive and standardized insight into the quality of national institutions and in all cases the impact on liquidity is expected to be positive.

3.  Data
3.1  Data and sample selection
In order to estimate our liquidity benchmark, the bid-ask spread plus brokerage commissions we procure the end of day bid and ask quotes for Nigeria, Kenya, Mauritius, South Africa and Zimbabwe from Bloomberg while those for Tanzania, BRVM, Ghana, Zambia, Namibia, Botswana, Malawi and Mozambique are obtained direct from national stock exchanges.  In all cases sample data ends in June 2012, while there is a considerable difference in historical availability of data and thus the starting date varies.  For both South African markets (JSE Main board and ALT-x development board) data are available from January 2000; for Namibia from January 1998; for BRVM (Cote d’Ivoire) from September 1998; for Malawi from July 2002; from Botswana from January 2003; for Zambia from January 2005; for Kenya and Mauritius from January and April 2009 respectively; for Ghana from July 2007; for Nigeria from October 2009 and Zimbabwe from January 2010.​[5]​
	The computation of our individual liquidity estimators involved obtaining daily closing stock price data in local currency form from: Bloomberg for South Africa (Main and ALT-x development boards), Zimbabwe, Kenya, Mauritius, Nigeria and Ghana; and national stock exchanges in case of Namibia, Zambia, Malawi, Botswana and BRVM.  Local stock prices are used in estimation of LOT (1999) daily zero returns and Amihud (2002) price impact measures.  Finally in order to compute turnover, Amihud and Liu measures, daily trading volume and total numbers of shares outstanding data were sourced from Bloomberg and national stock exchanges.  It should be noted that the shares-outstanding is determined at the start of the year and remains constant for the 12 months thereafter.
	The primary source of firm governance and ownership characteristics in the first instance was the African Financials website (African Financials, 2012) in the light of patchy coverage at best of African region in databases such as Bloomberg and Datastream.  African Financials provides a dissemination service of annual reports and stock exchange filings for a comprehensive sample of SSA markets.  However in many cases the database is incomplete in its holdings of annual reports for individual listed firms and in these cases individual firm websites in conjunction with regulatory authorities and national stock exchanges were used to additionally supplement data.  A further limitation is the opacity in reporting accurate ownership in annual reports, with this being attributed to general nominee accounts or omitted altogether.  This both necessitated the consultation of additional sources as well as the employment of simple dummy variable (1/0) in representing involvement of six various corporate and state entities in listed firm’s ownership and organizational structure as opposed to reporting share ownership levels.
	The six country level institutional quality measures are sourced exclusively from World Bank Governance website​[6]​.  These were first introduced by Kaufman et al (2009) and are constructed using an unobserved components methodology.  Values range between -2.5 to +2.5, where higher values relate to better governance outcomes.  Each indicator is recalculated and updated every two years while the indicators were back-calculated to start in 1999.  Finally to further facilitate comparison each indicator is rebased on a scale of 0 to 1.
Descriptive statistics are reported in Table 1.  One observation is the common pattern of high bid-ask spread and high price rigidity with low traded volume.​[7]​.  Exceptions are Botswana, where bid-ask spread and price rigidity are high while traded volume is also high, and Nigeria where bid-ask spread is low while price rigidity and traded volume is high.  A second observation is that average prices are higher in civil code law markets than in common law countries, which is likely a reflection of a different market microstructure (see Bruton et al, 2010).
	However, most importantly is the share of the sample for which the liquidity estimators are empirically undefined as has been noted in smaller and illiquid markets (Lesmond, 2005). A particular problem relates to the Amihud (2002) price impact measure, which can only be reliably constructed for South Africa and Kenya, and hence is dropped from further consideration in this paper.  However, the data in Table 1 is the criterion for sample selection as the availability of bid-ask spread information is essential to the study.  Thus, Swaziland is omitted from Southern Africa group, Tanzania and Uganda are omitted from the East Africa group and Cameroon, Cape Verde Islands, and Sierra Leone are omitted from the West African group.  In addition, the markets in Rwanda and Mozambique are omitted owing to insufficient listed firms and thus twelve markets comprise the final sample size.
Table 1

3.2  Sub Saharan African business environment
A significant feature of African business environments is the diversity in institutional quality and pattern of alternative governance mechanisms, complicated by the extent of extended family structures and business networks, see Table 2.  Institutional quality generally varies from the highest level for all six World Bank indicators in Mauritius, South Africa, Namibia and Botswana in the south, plus the Cape Verde Islands in the west to some of the lowest levels in Cote d’Ivoire (BRVM), Nigeria, Rwanda and Zimbabwe.
	There are also considerable differences in ownership by the state, the presence of foreign partners, domestic and foreign venture capitalists and whether firms have owner-founders on the board or are part of a network of family groups or extended business networks.  With respect to ownership by the state there is a marked difference the investment of South Africa and the rest of SSA.  In South Africa this is limited to investment in the Public Investment Corporation (PIC) and Government Employees Pension Funds and the telecommunications conglomerate, Telkom SA, whereas elsewhere the state remains involved following privatisation and actively encourages early stage investment by long term foreign partners.  A large number of owner-founders retain an interest in South African firms, indeed the ALT-x development board of the Johannesburg was introduced for this reason.  However, this is not the case elsewhere, with the exception of Namibia and Nigeria.  Thus, capital markets perform a different function in South Africa and provide support for external funding, along with an active domestic venture capital industry, none of which is found in the majority of SSA markets.​[8]​  There is also evidence that the relationship between the number of firms that are members of family groups or extended business networks is not related to institutional quality
Table 2

Further evidence about family involvement in firms is in Table 3.  The greatest frequency of extended business and family networks is in Mauritius, where five families (Harel, Dargais, Espitalier Noël, Lagesse and Currimjee) account for over 70% of total market capitalization and traded value.  Similarly large extended networks exist in Nigeria, where a single network (the Dangote family) account for 28% of total market capitalization and 14% of traded value.  There are similar organisational structures in Northern Nigeria where it is common for the role of Chairman to be allocated to powerful indigenous leaders such as Alhaji Idris (Emir of Zazezu) or Chief Kola-Daisi.  This illustrates the ambiguity in Nigerian corporate governance where there is a widespread adoption of an Anglo-American unitary board structure, with an emphasis on Non-executive roles such as the Chairman, while executive roles and in particular the CEO is considered subordinate to Nonexecutives, reflecting a supervisory two-tier board structure.  Altogether business and family groups account for 42% of total market capitalization and 28% of traded value on the Nigerian market.
Extended family groups and business networks are also common in Kenya, where these are not substantially different from government officials, reflecting the interlinked nature of the state and local social elites as is the case in Swaziland and Mozambique.  In the case of Zimbabwe, family groups and extended business networks account for approximately 50% of total stock market capitalization and over 57% traded value, although these are commonly groups of indigenous business executives and nonexecutives from retired government officials and ZANU-PF party members.  As such in this latter case business groups are more the product of a combination of both high transactions costs inhibiting external capital markets as well as from the impact of political structures, themselves underscored by the presence of social elites.  Finally, firms in the markets of the Cape Verde Islands and Mozambique retain ownership by the state and control by long term foreign partners following privatisation.
Table 3

Finally the correlations between the firm level corporate governance measures and the institutional quality factors, or national governance indicators, plus the bid-ask spread and proportion of daily zero returns (price rigidity) are not reported but are available from authors upon request.  However, one observation of particular interest is the negative correlation between state involvement in firms and the World Bank governance indicators.  This may be a function of the stage of development.  Not surprisingly, foreign venture capitalists are not involved in markets where firms are commonly linked to extended families and networks, due to asymmetric information whereas domestic venture capitalists are associated with owner-founder entrepreneurial firms.  Entrepreneurs also flourish where national institutions are of high quality.

4.  ESTIMATION
4.1  Relationship between liquidity measures and bid-ask spread plus commission costs
An assessment of the ability of liquidity measures to explain total costs
To determine this relationship a single regression for each market is estimated where the endogenous variable is the bid-ask spread plus commission as described in Appendix Table 1.  The regressors are the three liquidity measures introduced first individually and then together.  The firm level governance measures are included plus the four Stoll (2000) controls.  Owing to persistence in liquidity measures over time (see Agarwal (2011) as well as Pedersen (2009) for extended discussion) we have estimated the standard errors by clustering them on time dimensions using White cross section robust standard errors and covariances method.  This ensures that inference, based on standard errors, is robust to correlation across residuals within a firm over time​[9]​.

Direct model comparisons:  Vuong likelihood ratio test
Model selection was based on the Vuong (1989) methods, following Lesmond (2005), given this is appropriate in the context of emerging markets (see appendix in Lesmond (2005) for detailed mathematical exposition).  This tests the null hypothesis that either model is equally good at explaining the underlying data generating process for liquidity with an alternate hypothesis that one is better.  The likelihood ratio Z-score test statistic indicates whether the reference model is better at explaining the comparison model with a one-sided probability.  The reference models in this case are either the turnover or Liu (2006) liquidity measures, and the comparison models are the controls, the six firm governance measures and the zero daily returns measure.  The zero daily returns is a comparison model in the Liu reference model tests.  A positive and significant one-sided probability indicates that the turnover or Liu measure is statistically superior to the alternative liquidity measures.  Lesmond (2005) asserts that a positive sign for the Z-score test statistic indicates the reference model has a higher Adj R2 statistic than the competing models.

4.2  Institutional determinants of liquidity
Random effects regressions use the unbalanced dataset of annual means of the four Stoll market controls, the six firm level governance measures and the six World Bank Governance Indicators to explain the four measures of liquidity.  Random effects was the chosen specification as this adjusts the variance for country-level cross-correlation resulting from commonly omitted factors within each country, while there is negligible variation in institutional quality within countries (Lesmond, 2005).

5.  Results and discussion
5.1  Relationship between liquidity measures and bid-ask spread plus commission costs
Table 4 shows the extent of the differences between SSA equity markets.  The explanatory power ranges from between 6% and 7% in Nigeria and BRVM (Cote d’Ivoire) to between 14% and 16% in Ghana, Malawi and Zambia and over 40% in Namibia, South Africa, Zimbabwe and Mauritius.  These findings are comparable to those in West African markets (Hearn and Piesse, 2010) and South Africa (Lesmond, 2005).  Generally the signs and statistical significance of the estimated coefficients on the Stoll (2000) control variables for all models are similar to Lesmond (2005) where price and traded volume are negative and volatility is positive.  However, there is generally more consistency in the the estimated market capitalization coefficients, which are largely negative and significant compared to the mixed evidence in Lesmond (2005).
	There are also differences in the firm governance estimates across markets.  Firstly, as expected firms in SME (development/ lower) boards have positive and statistically significant relationships with total trading costs, as shown in Botswana (a domestic venture capital board) and in Mauritius.  This is largely a function of uncertainty over future cash flows and profitability, which is reflected in higher bid-ask spreads.  However, the evidence relating to the other firm governance measures is more mixed.  State involvement has a positive and statistically significant impact in South Africa, BRVM and Malawi but negative elsewhere, while there is no impact in Botswana and the ALT-x market in South Africa.  The presence of early-stage long term foreign partner generally leads to a positive and statistically significant association with total trading costs with the exception of Zimbabwe where this relationship lacks significance at any discernible confidence level.  This result is not surprising as there is clearly an exploitative element to this involvement.  
Firms with owner-founders on the board have a negative impact on bid ask spread in the most advanced markets of South Africa (Main Board), Botswana and Ghana, although the last is not significant but the reverse is true in all the others, including the South African ALT-x market.  Extended family networks and business group affiliation tend to lower transactions costs in all markets with the exception of Kenya where this is positive and statistically significant and Nigeria where it has no impact.  This suggests that in Kenya and Nigeria family groups are more likely to exploit their ownership and control.  Finally, the evidence relating to domestic venture capitalists involvement in listed firms has a negative relationship with total trading costs (except in Zimbabwe) while foreign venture capitalists involvement generally has a positive impact.  As proposed above, foreign funders are more eager to exit quickly compared with domestic funders.
	The addition of liquidity to the models shows that turnover and proportion of zero returns coefficients are largely statistically significant and increase explanatory power more than the multidimensional Liu (2006) measure.  It is notable however that in all markets the liquidity measure coefficients are positive with respect to total trading costs, except in the case of Malawi and Kenya for which there is no obvious explanation.  However at this stage there is general support for the turnover measure and proportion of daily zero returns construct.  This is robust given that it takes account of the alternative governance mechanisms in listed firms, such as family/business group affiliation and the involvement of the state, foreign partners and venture capital, which have been ignored in previous studies. 
Table 4

Comparison of liquidity measures:  Vuong likelihood ratio test
The Vuong (1989) maximum likelihood tests are in Table 5 and examine the case for rejecting the Stoll (2000) control variables or the alternative liquidity constructs in favour of the two reference measures, the proportion of daily zero returns and Liu (2006).
	The relative weakness of the turnover ratio is demonstrated in the first and last column of the Table where the coefficients on the Stoll controls, the firm governance variables and the other liquidity estimators are all negative and largely statistically significant.  In particular, the negative coefficients on the other liquidity measures suggest that turnover is less able to explain bid-ask spread than either the proportion of zero returns or Liu (2006).  Further evidence of the different relative strength of these two measures is in the middle columns where these are considered individually against turnover for each market.  In 9 out of 12 markets the proportion of zero returns measure is statistically superior to turnover although this is less clear for the Liu construct, which is only superior to turnover in 7 out of 12 markets and in the South Africa main board and Malawi turnover is actually superior to Liu.
	The last three columns of Table 5 address the Liu measure compared to the Stoll controls plus firm governance variables and finally the proportion of zero returns and turnover.  All of the coefficients on the controls and governance variables are negative and statistically significant indicating the relative weakness of the Liu measure to explain bid-ask spread, similar to that of the turnover construct.  However, the Liu measure is statistically superior to the reference group of measures in Botswana and Zimbabwe (positive and statistically significant coefficient) while in only 6 of the other 12 markets are coefficients negative, indicating the relative strength of the Liu measure.  Further, while the proportion of zero returns coefficient is negative and statistically significant in 6 out of 12 markets, suggesting superiority to Liu, again in Botswana and Zimbabwe the coefficient is positive and statistically significant indicating the superiority of Liu over the proportion of zero returns.
	Overall these findings indicate the relative weakness of all liquidity measures in capturing bid-ask spread compared to the Stoll (2000) controls and the firm governance variables.  However, they do provide support for the statistical superiority of the Liu measure and in particular the proportion of daily zero returns measure.
Table 5

5.2  The determinants of liquidity: institutions
The results of random effects panel regressions that add each of the six World Bank Governance Indicators and Stoll market controls for both the LOT (1999) proportion of zero daily returns price-rigidity measure and Bid-Ask spread are in Table 6.  The results for the remaining two liquidity measures, Liu and turnover have been omitted for brevity and are available from authors upon request.  There are some notable differences in relationships between the Stoll (2000) market controls and liquidity measures that are in direct contrast to the findings of Stoll (2000) and Lesmond (2005).  The first is that the coefficient on price lacks statistical significance in models with the Liu and turnover constructs as the dependent variable and while these are significant in the bid-ask spread and proportion of zero returns models they are positive.  This is counter-intuitive and likely reflects the very different institutional and governance environments in these markets compared to the US equity market, which is the focus of Stoll (2000) and or the larger emerging markets in Lesmond (2005).  Generally there is a negative relationship between market capitalization and illiquidity as expected while volatility generally has a negative relationship with illiquidity (bid-ask spread, proportion of zero returns and Liu construct) and a positive association with liquidity (turnover).  The relationship between traded volume and all measures of liquidity is more variable and statistical insignificance with respect to the proportion of zero returns and bid-ask spread and significance in Liu and the turnover measure.
	Finally in terms of the relationship between the World Bank governance indicators and the liquidity measures, these are generally of the expected sign with the exception of the Liu (2006) and turnover measures where all coefficients are positive.  The coefficients for government effectiveness and regulatory quality alone are large, positive and retain their statistical significance at a high confidence margin in explaining the LOT (1999) proportion of zero returns and the turnover measure while all other institutional quality indices lack statistical significance.  It is notable that these two institutional quality measures are also significant in models explaining the Liu (2006) and bid-ask spread.  However in the former case all institutional quality coefficients are positive and retain statistical significance while in the latter only the rule of law coefficients retains significance in addition to government effectiveness and regulatory quality.  The size, direction and statistical significance of coefficient between rule of law and bid-ask spread institutional quality measure, in addition to significance of government effectiveness and regulatory quality, reflects the findings in Hearn and Piesse (2012) that used World Bank governance indices to explain illiquidity measured by the proportion of zero returns as well as bid-ask spread in the small frontier market of Namibia.




This paper contrasts the ability of proportion of daily zero returns measure (LOT 1999) against turnover and a multidimensional trading speed measure (Liu, 2006) in explaining total trading costs, a function of bid-ask spread and brokerage commissions for respective buy and sell legs of a trade, within the context of twelve prominent emerging and frontier equity markets in Sub Saharan African region.  However, unlike similar recent cross-country studies of liquidity this paper includes national and firm level governance determinants.  External governance is measured using the World Bank institutional quality indices and internal mechanisms are captured by the extent to which the listed firm is partly owned by the state, has an early-stage long term foreign partner, domestic or foreign venture capital involvement, is part of an extended family group or business network and whether firm is entrepreneurial, that is, has an owner-founder on the board.
Ordinary least squares regression and a maximum likelihood technique developed by Vuong (1989) are used to test this association on firm listed on a sample of emerging and frontier markets in SSA: South Africa (Main and ALT-x development boards), Namibia, Botswana, Malawi, Zambia, Zimbabwe, Mauritius, Kenya, Nigeria, Ghana, BRVM (Cote d’Ivoire).  The institutional determinants of liquidity are explored using the six established World Bank measures, namely corruption control, government effectiveness, political stability & absence from violence, regulatory quality, rule of law and democratic voice & accountability.
	The findings reveal substantial support for the evidence of previous studies regarding the robustness and utility of proportion of zero returns indicator (LOT (1999) and Bekaert et al (2007)) in explaining the exchange quoted bid-ask spread plus commissions, albeit within the context of SSA equity markets.  Further analysis using the Vuong (1989) maximum likelihood framework reveals that the LOT (1999) zero returns measure is more robust than any of the others in capturing the price rigidity aspect of liquidity.  However, the relative weakness of all the liquidity estimators compared to the Stoll (2000) market controls and the firm governance variables highlights the importance for taking account of the alternative governance systems that exist in many markets as these may be viable alternatives to the institutions that exist in formal external capital markets based systems.
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Table 1.  Sub Saharan Africa equity market summary statistics
Descriptive statistics for 20 SSA equity markets including the 12 that comprise the final sample.  Start dates vary for each country while sample end dates are June 2012 across all markets.  N is sample size.  Price is the mean daily price for each month and converted to US$ using the mean exchange rate for each month and country.  Volume is the mean of the daily trading volume for each month in thousands.  Market capitalization is of 1 January for each country and is equity market value for each firm in millions of local currency or US$.  The bid-ask spread is defined in Table 3.  The monthly mean is for all stocks to obtain a market wide measure.  The US$ market capitalization is the end of month exchange rate for each country and month.  Square parentheses indicate median values for each variable.
				Local market			US$ equivalent		Proportion sample undefined (%)
Country	Final sample	Sample Start	N	Bid-Ask spread (%)	Zero Return (%)	Volume (m)	Price	Mkt. Cap (b)	Bid-Ask Spread	Amihud (2002)	Liu (2006)	TO	Zero return
Southern Africa												
South Africa	Yes	01/2000	256	9.00 [2.84]	58.28 [53.33]	11.09 [2.47]	3.48 [1.12]	1.08 [0.16]	11.21	8.82	4.67	4.67	0.06
SA Alt-x	Yes	01/2000	54	33.89 [16.67]	80.67 [82.14]	3.47 [0.57]	0.21 [0.05]	0.01 [0.01]	1.96	18.88	10.28	10.26	0.07
Namibia	Yes	01/1998	31	29.10 [18.18]	92.73 [98.39]	0.68 [0.08]	1.42 [0.28]	0.07 [0.02]	28.42	73.59	52.40	52.40	0.27
Swaziland	No	01/2000	5	-- --	99.22 [100.00]	0.30 [0.00]	0.08 [0.08]	3.57 [0.94]	100.00	97.90	79.80	79.80	0.14
Mozambique	No	09/2011	2	17.79 [15.79]	98.87 [98.39]	0.04 [0.02]	6.37 [5.96]	0.15 [0.10]	28.42	95.45	36.36	27.27	18.18
													
South-central Africa												
Zambia	Yes	01/2005	31	11.74 [5.45]	89.33 [93.55]	5.87 [0.12]	0.38 [0.10]	0.10 [0.04]	37.29	52.44	29.61	29.61	0.00
Zimbabwe	Yes	01/2010	72	19.66 [11.78]	81.54 [83.87]	3.99 [1.07]	0.26 [0.05]	0.05 [0.01]	11.87	17.21	13.39	13.39	0.00
Malawi	Yes	07/2002	18	13.01 [7.43]	98.44 [100.00]	2.52 [0.15]	0.29 [0.06]	0.06 [0.00]	31.12	92.89	43.44	43.38	0.00
Botswana	Yes	01/ 2003	30	8.68 [4.77]	91.51 [95.00]	721.62 [55.02]	1.09 [0.06]	0.02 [0.01]	9.08	62.55	11.74	11.74	0.00
													
East Africa													
Kenya	Yes	01/2009	58	9.54 [9.34]	59.39 [53.33]	8.56 [0.57]	0.67 [0.28]	0.21 [0.06]	6.22	10.76	8.31	8.31	0.00
Mauritius	Yes	04/2009	89	5.90 [4.87]	85.12 [90.00]	0.50 [0.03]	6.13 [1.44]	0.08 [0.03]	6.01	34.08	9.79	9.79	0.00
Tanzania	No	01/1999	15	4.84 [6.09]	90.81 [95.00]	0.65 [0.06]	0.72 [0.57]	0.09 [0.02]	99.48	57.03	15.55	15.55	0.09
Rwanda	No	01/2011	2	4.82 [4.68]	68.34 [68.87]	5.18 [5.04]	0.34 [0.35]	0.12 [0.15]	7.41	7.41	3.70	3.70	7.41




				Local market			US$ equivalent		Proportion sample undefined (%)
Country	Sample	Sample Start	N	Bid-Ask spread (%)	Zero Return (%)	Volume (m)	Price	Mkt. Cap (b)	Bid-Ask Spread	Amihud (2002)	Liu (2006)	TO	Zero return
West Africa													
Nigeria	Yes	10/2009	201	1.80 [0.90]	81.45 [96.67]	45.46 [5.33]	0.28 [0.02]	0.22 [0.02]	47.01	48.91	19.58	19.58	0.00
BVRM	Yes	09/ 1998	47	6.66 [3.24]	90.49 [95.45]	0.02 [0.00]	50.38 [23.60]	0.07 [0.02]	33.93	54.55	30.65	30.65	0.02
Ghana	Yes	07/2007	42	14.23 [3.44]	91.28 [100.00]	0.64 [0.07]	2.93 [0.32]	0.37 [0.04]	47.04	73.41	43.52	43.52	0.00
Cameroon	No	09/ 2011	3	-- --	93.84 [96.30]	0.01 [0.00]	144.33 [105.95]	0.07 [0.04]	100.00	81.48	44.44	44.44	0.00
Cape Verde Is.	No	12/ 2005	4	-- --	97.49 [98.39]	0.01 [0.00]	59.67 [66.76]	18.12 [19.08]	100.00	72.30	43.24	43.24	0.00
Sierra Leone	No	01/2009	1	-- --	98.92 [100.00]	3.60 [1.58]	0.001 [0.00]	0.02 [0.02]	100.00	80.00	8.57	8.57	0.00
Source:	Compiled by authors from Bloomberg, Datastream and National stock exchanges
Notes:	(1) US$ Exchange rates from Bloomberg and Datastream





Table 2.  Sample descriptive statistics
Average firm governance characteristics for all listed firms on every stock market in SSA and six institutional quality measures.  The firm governance measures are dummy variables taking value 1 if condition is satisfied and 0 otherwise for involvement of state, foreign partner, owner-founder retained on board, whether firm is part of extended family group/ business network and whether participation of domestic as opposed to foreign venture capitalists (VC).  Sourced from annual reports on AfricanFinancials (http://www.africanfinancials.com (​http:​/​​/​www.africanfinancials.com​/​​)) or from websites of individual firms, stock exchanges and national regulatory authorities.  The average values are presented for each of the six political, governmental, regulatory and legal institutional quality indices (Kaufman et al (2009)).  Indicators 1 to 6 have been rescaled on a 0-1 scale.  Governance Indicators are downloadable from http://www.govindicators.org (​http:​/​​/​www.govindicators.org​). Legal Family is defined as country’s legal system falling within following legal families: French or Portuguese civil code or English Common law as defined by La Porta et al (2008).
Market		Proportions of listed firms with involvement of following entities (%)		Institutional measures


























Cape Verde Is.	Portuguese Civil	100.00	50.00	0.00	25.00	0.00	25.00		0.807	0.851	0.512	0.563	0.677	0.593
Sierra Leone	Common	100.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		0.519	0.634	0.275	0.401	0.356	0.197




Table 3.  Sub Saharan African family and business groups in 2012
Degree of family group/ business network influence throughout stock market measured as number of firms under control of group/network and proportions of total market capitalization (US$m) and total traded value (US$m) cumulatively attributable to top 1, top 2, top 5, top 10 and then all family groups/ business networks operating in national market.  Data are from annual reports on AfricanFinancials (http://www.africanfinancials.com (​http:​/​​/​www.africanfinancials.com​/​​)) or from websites of individual firms, stock exchanges and national regulatory authorities.
	No. Listed Firms	No. Family/ Bus. group firms	No. Family/ Bus. groups	Mkt. Cap. USD (m)	Proportion of total Mkt. Cap. per family/ business group (%)		Traded Value USD (m)	Proportion of total Traded value per family/ business group (%)
Market				Total	Top 1	Top 2	Top 5	Top 10	All		Total	Top 1	Top 2	Top 5	Top 10	All
Southern Africa															
SA Main	256	38	38	438,915.96	1.81	2.94	5.03	6.30	7.09		136,853.21	1.25	2.42	3.68	4.49	4.62
SA Alt-x	54	5	5	198,825.81	0.82	1.43	3.37	-- --	3.37		1,011.12	0.70	1.26	3.14	-- --	3.14
Namibia	31	0	0	1,485.89	-- --	-- --	-- --	-- --	-- --		38.12	-- --	-- --	-- --	-- --	-- --
Swaziland	5	5	1	230.59	64.68	84.46	-- --	-- --	93.54		-- --	-- --	-- --	-- --	-- --	-- --
Mozambique	2	2	1	471.02	100.00	-- --	-- --	-- --	100.00		2.22	100.00	-- --	-- --	-- --	100.00
																
South-central Africa															
Zambia	31	2	2	2,687.36	4.80	5.25	-- --	-- --	5.25		42.88	2.41	2.42	-- --	-- --	2.42
Zimbabwe	72	25	14 (5)	3,268.27	23.77	36.02	46.44	49.38	49.58		166.11	42.78	49.46	55.66	57.21	57.24
Malawi	18	5	1	9,736.45	3.45	-- --	-- --	-- --	3.45		5.03	56.26	-- --	-- --	-- --	56.26





Tanzania	15	0	0	1,330.47	-- --	-- --	-- --	-- --	-- --		11.15	-- --	-- --	-- --	-- --	-- --
Rwanda	2	0	0	341.96	-- --	-- --	-- --	-- --	-- --		11.33	-- --	-- --	-- --	-- --	-- --




BVRM	47	0	0	4,740.47	-- --	-- --	-- --	-- --	-- --		37.48	-- --	-- --	-- --	-- --	-- --
Ghana	42	3	3	14,060.68	0.31	0.35	-- --	-- --	0.35		22.56	16.17	16.71	-- --	-- --	16.72
Cameroon	3	2	3	213.11	64.98	95.29	-- --	-- --	100.00		0.97	88.56	97.85	-- --	-- --	100.00
Cape Verde	4	1	1	100.28	45.31	-- --	-- --	-- --	45.31		0.11	32.89	-- --	-- --	-- --	32.89
Sierra Leone	1	0	0	19.08	-- --	-- --	-- --	-- --	-- --		0.09	-- --	-- --	-- --	-- --	-- --
Notes:	(1) Value in parentheses for Mauritius and Zimbabwe indicates number of families (in Mauritius) and business groups (in Zimbabwe) that numerically dominate
business environment and listings
	(2) No family groups recorded in Namibia as family controlled firms delisted prior to 2012
	(3) Single largest family group in Cameroon is one foreign (Luxembourg-based) family. The largest single family group in Kenya is Aga-Khan family




Table 4  Results of regressions of total costs on liquidity proxies and measures:  Dependent variable - bid-ask spread plus commission
Regressions are on a firm-monthly basis.  Three liquidity measurement variables are presented.  Liu (2006) , turnover is a ratio of the traded volume of shares in relation to total number of shares outstanding and is scaled by the number of trading days in the month of measurement.  It provides a measure of trading frequency.  The final measure is the Bid Ask spread which is the average daily relative bid ask spread over the prior 1 month, where daily relative spread is the local currency denominated spread divided by average of Bid and Ask prices.  Firm size is determined from the first day of each month.  Volatility is the average daily stock return variance and price and volume measure the average price (local currency units) and trading volume over an annual trading period.  Turnover, price, volume, and market capitalisation are all log scaled in line with Stoll (2000).  SME Firm development boards in Nigeria, Mauritius and ALT-x in South Africa, while “SME board” in Botswana represents “Listed Domestic Venture Capital Firms”.  N is the sample size in firm months.  The White cross-section t-statistics are in parentheses.
	BRVM (N = 3,643)	Ghana (N = 731)
	Controls	Zero (%)	Liu	Turnover	Overall	Controls	Zero (%)	Liu	Turnover	Overall
Intercept	0.301[10.55] †	0.280[8.77] †	0.297[10.27] †	0.454[10.18] †	0.456[10.29] †	0.397[1.92]**	0.539[2.18]**	0.370[1.87]**	-0.159[-0.54]	-0.155[-0.51]
% Zero Returns		0.0001[1.53]*			0.0003[3.58] †		-0.001[-1.11]			-0.002[-2.07]**
Liu			0.0001[0.74]		0.001[2.48] †			0.001[1.15]		0.0003[0.52]
Turnover				-0.009[-4.06] †	-0.014[-5.65] †				0.027[1.80]**	0.039[2.58] †
Ownership Controls										
State	0.023[7.10] †	0.023[7.11] †	0.023[7.11] †	0.021[6.73] †	0.022[6.82] †	-0.059[-2.08]**	-0.052[-1.81]**	-0.057[-2.06]**	-0.061[-2.11]**	-0.049[-1.77]**
Foreign Partner	0.024[7.17] †	0.024[7.19] †	0.024[7.17] †	0.024[7.19] †	0.025[7.28] †	-- --	-- --	-- --	-- --	-- --
Founder	-- --	-- --	-- --	-- --	-- --	-0.027[-1.11]	-0.019[-0.73]	-0.026[-1.09]	-0.029[-1.16]	-0.016[-0.63]
Family/ Business Group	-- --	-- --	-- --	-- --	-- --	-0.080[-2.05]**	-0.085[-2.13]**	-0.077[-2.03]**	-0.083[-2.13]**	-0.092[-2.32]**
Domestic VC	-- --	-- --	-- --	-- --	-- --	-- --	-- --	-- --	-- --	-- --
Foreign VC	-0.015[-5.47] †	-0.015[-5.52] †	-0.015[-5.48] †	-0.015[-5.54] †	-0.016[-5.99] †	-- --	-- --	-- --	-- --	-- --
SME Board	-0.003[-0.81]	-0.002[-0.69]	-0.003[-0.80]	-0.002[-0.60]	-0.003[-0.10]	-- --	-- --	-- --	-- --	-- --
Market Controls										
Price	-0.009[-7.46] †	-0.009[-7.38] †	-0.009[-7.14] †	-0.001[-0.61]	0.005[1.71]**	0.004[0.41]	0.004[0.39]	0.007[0.61]	-0.024[-1.50]*	-0.036[-1.98]**
Volatility	-0.013[-0.63]	-0.008[-0.33]	-0.013[-0.63]	-0.015[-0.77]	-0.002[-0.08]	2.322[5.76] †	2.299[5.58] †	2.316[5.81] †	2.388[5.67] †	2.373[5.65] †
Volume	-0.001[-0.91]	-0.004[-0.52]	-0.004[-0.38]	0.006[3.38] †	0.012[5.29] †	0.003[0.82]	0.001[0.37]	0.006[1.06]	-0.019[-1.82]**	-0.030[-2.40] †







	Nigeria (N = 1,935)	Kenya (N = 1,942)
	Controls	Zero (%)	Liu	Turnover	Overall	Controls	Zero (%)	Liu	Turnover	Overall
Intercept	0.123[3.70]	0.089[1.87]	0.105[4.49]	0.015[0.22]	0.067[0.81]	0.162[10.28] †	0.226[14.73] †	0.210[11.92] †	0.457[12.30] †	0.374[9.16] †




State	-0.002[-1.28]*	-0.003[-1.31]*	-0.003[-1.42]*	-0.003[-1.35]*	-0.003[-1.39]*	-0.009[-9.44] †	-0.011[-9.76] †	-0.010[-9.40] †	-0.011[-9.93] †	-0.011[-10.09] †
Foreign Partner	0.002[1.06]	0.002[1.28]*	0.003[1.43]*	0.003[1.45]*	0.003[1.53]*	0.018[9.44] †	0.018[9.22] †	0.016[8.24] †	0.015[7.45] †	0.016[8.04] †
Founder	0.001[0.73]	0.001[1.18]	0.001[0.56]	0.001[0.71]	0.001[0.93]	0.009[3.20] †	0.006[1.77]**	0.009[3.12] †	0.007[2.51] †	0.006[1.84]
Family/ Business Group	0.002[0.87]	0.002[0.96]	0.002[0.90]	0.002[0.91]	0.002[0.92]	0.013[9.51] †	0.009[6.47] †	0.010[6.56] †	0.008[6.06] †	0.007[5.59] †
Domestic VC	0.002[0.86]	0.001[0.56]	0.002[1.15]	0.003[1.33]*	0.002[0.96]	0.001[0.21]	0.001[0.00]	0.002[0.71]	0.002[0.62]	0.001[0.36]
Foreign VC	0.001[0.32]	0.002[0.53]	0.001[0.24]	0.0004[0.15]	0.001[0.43]	0.003[1.64]*	0.002[1.20]	0.002[0.94]	0.001[0.69]	0.001[0.79]
SME Board	-0.011[-0.95]	-0.010[-0.87]	-0.018[-1.27]	-0.026[-1.22]	-0.018[-0.87]	-- --	-- --	-- --	-- --	-- --
Market Controls										
Price	0.001[0.92]	0.001[0.82]	0.003[1.15]	-0.007[-1.17]	0.001[0.13]	-0.011[-11.22] †	-0.010[-10.74] †	-0.012[-12.11] †	0.012[3.86] †	0.003[0.64]
Volatility	0.307[1.53]	0.406[1.50]	0.320[1.49]	0.313[1.47]	0.393[1.37]	0.066[1.35]*	0.050[1.43]*	0.062[1.34]*	0.057[1.36]*	0.051[1.41]*
Volume	-0.003[-4.43]	-0.002[-2.36]	-0.001[-1.29]	-0.011[-1.47]	-0.002[-0.22]	0.002[2.79] †	0.0002[0.40]	-0.002[-2.17] †	0.022[7.93] †	0.012[3.05] †





	Mauritius (N = 2,222)	Zambia (N = 894)
	Controls	Zero (%)	Liu	Turnover	Overall	Controls	Zero (%)	Liu	Turnover	Overall
Intercept	0.118[9.85] †	0.006[0.41]	0.115[9.19] †	-0.082[-3.49] †	-0.084[-3.02] †	0.576[7.70] †	0.176[1.67]**	0.584[7.88] †	-0.640[-3.04] †	-0.665[-3.10] †
% Zero Returns		0.001[15.29] †			0.001[10.41] †		0.002[5.82] †			0.001[1.96]**
Liu			0.0003[1.63]*		0.0002[1.76]**			0.0001[1.53]*		-5.75E-05[-0.54]
Turnover				0.013[9.69] †	0.008[4.39] †				0.067[6.48] †	0.061[5.20] †
Ownership Controls										
State	-0.007[-4.65] †	-0.002[-1.73]**	-0.006[-4.25] †	-0.004[-2.91] †	-0.002[-1.28]*	-0.016[-1.41]*	-0.008[-0.66]	-0.017[-1.51]*	-0.011[-1.28]*	-0.009[-0.89]
Foreign Partner	0.0004[0.18]	0.001[0.29]	-0.001[-0.55]	0.002[0.57]	4.87E-05[0.02]	0.029[2.37] †	0.038[3.24] †	0.032[2.55] †	0.055[4.34] †	0.055[4.41] †
Founder	0.046[3.70] †	0.041[3.24] †	0.046[3.69] †	0.037[3.03] †	0.036[2.96] †	0.030[1.84]**	0.026[1.64]*	0.031[1.96]**	0.048[3.05] †	0.045[2.88] †
Family/ Business Group	-0.001[-1.04]	0.0001[0.08]	-0.002[-1.16]	0.0001[-0.22]	0.0003[0.25]	0.036[1.12]	0.038[1.18]	0.036[1.11]	0.024[0.79]	0.026[0.86]
Domestic VC	-- --	-- --	-- --	-- --	-- --	-- --	-- --	-- --	-- --	-- --
Foreign VC	0.006[2.12]**	0.007[2.65] †	0.006[2.46] †	0.007[2.67] †	0.008[3.08] †	-0.038[-1.01]	-0.002[-0.05]	-0.033[-0.88]	0.022[0.61]	0.027[0.74]
SME Board	0.019[11.84] †	0.013[9.30] †	0.018[10.25] †	0.015[9.61] †	0.012[8.17] †	-- --	-- --	-- --	-- --	-- --
Market Controls										
Price	-0.001[-0.80]	-0.0004[-0.57]	0.001[0.53]	-0.013[-8.16] †	-0.007[-3.27] †	0.752[4.88] †	-0.002[-0.71]	-0.002[-0.45]	-0.064[-6.47] †	-0.059[-4.95] †
Volatility	1.058[7.78] †	1.278[8.40] †	1.043[7.74] †	1.093[7.97] †	1.239[8.18] †	-0.003[-1.15]	0.867[5.37] †	0.753[4.89] †	0.793[5.29] †	0.828[5.35] †
Volume	-0.006[-10.80] †	-0.004[-7.34] †	-0.004[-5.63] †	-0.016[-13.38] †	-0.009[-5.60] †	-0.018[-5.00] †	0.0004[0.17]	-0.002[-0.58]	-0.060[-6.54] †	-0.054[-4.84] †





	Malawi (N = 897)	Botswana (N = 1,473)
	Controls	Zero (%)	Liu	Turnover	Overall	Controls	Zero (%)	Liu	Turnover	Overall
Intercept	-0.134[-2.47] †	0.307[2.27] †	-0.155[-2.78] †	0.540[2.51] †	0.919[4.42] †	0.252[6.53] †	0.187[4.28] †	0.100[2.28] †	-0.180[-1.82] **	-0.159[-1.28]*
% Zero Returns		-0.004[-3.63] †			-0.004[-2.75] †		0.0004[2.37] †			-1.98E-05[-0.11]
Liu			-0.0002[-3.02] †		-3.25E-04[-2.92] †			0.003[5.01] †		0.001[0.44]
Turnover				-0.043[-2.99] †	-0.045[-2.98] †				0.023[4.81] †	0.021[2.27] †
Ownership Controls										
State	0.021[2.06]**	0.029[2.90] †	0.019[1.95]**	0.036[2.57] †	0.041[3.13] †	-- --	-- --	-- --	-- --	-- --
Foreign Partner	-0.019[-1.40]*	-0.015[-1.06]	-0.021[-1.52]*	-0.030[-1.88]**	-0.030[-1.72]**	0.012[2.36] †	0.011[2.20]**	0.008[1.63]**	0.006[1.28]*	0.006[1.28]*
Founder	-0.019[-1.19]	-0.005[-0.29]	-0.024[-1.46]*	-0.009[-0.64]	-0.004[-0.25]	-0.014[-3.03] †	-0.015[-3.28] †	-0.018[-3.86] †	-0.014[-3.07] †	-0.015[-2.90] †
Family/ Business Group	-0.014[-1.55]*	-0.018[-2.04]**	-0.014[-1.57]*	-0.041[-2.58] †	-0.046[-2.88] †	0.011[1.25]	0.010[1.17]	0.005[0.59]	0.002[0.21]	0.002[0.21]
Domestic VC	-- --	-- --	-- --	-- --	-- --	-- --	-- --	-- --	-- --	-- --
Foreign VC	-0.051[-4.96] †	-0.047[-4.31] †	-0.053[-4.97] †	-0.063[-4.84] †	-0.063[-4.33] †	0.021[1.91]**	0.017[1.54]*	0.004[0.38]	-0.007[-0.54]	-0.007[-0.52]
SME Board	-- --	-- --	-- --	-- --	-- --	0.060[5.89] †	0.060[5.89] †	0.056[5.66] †	0.049[4.58] †	0.049[4.51] †
Market Controls										
Price	-0.049[-5.22] †	-0.047[-4.87] †	-0.051[-5.25] †	-0.007[-0.93]	-0.007[-0.85]	-0.033[-13.25] †	-0.034[-13.66] †	-0.034[-13.64] †	-0.057[-9.99] †	-0.055[-5.65] †
Volatility	0.582[3.39] †	0.460[2.59] †	0.586[3.36] †	0.490[2.71] †	0.388[2.00]**	0.753[2.93] †	0.773[2.96] †	0.775[3.03] †	0.792[3.11] †	0.791[3.08] †
Volume	-0.013[-3.64] †	-0.013[-3.84] †	-0.014[-3.74] †	0.025[2.48] †	0.025[2.39] †	-0.004[-3.03] †	-0.003[-2.94] †	-0.002[-1.64]**	-0.024[-5.19] †	-0.022[-2.42] †





	Namibia (N = 1,248)	South Africa (N = 25,528)
	Controls	Zero (%)	Liu	Turnover	Overall	Controls	Zero (%)	Liu	Turnover	Overall
Intercept	1.402[2.98] †	1.050[2.13]**	1.372[2.95] †	1.068[1.36]*	1.181[1.42]*	0.476[10.81] †	0.251[4.53] †	0.471[10.67] †	-0.838[-13.13] †	-0.844[-13.08] †




State	-- --	-- --	-- --	-- --	-- --	0.012[7.31] †	0.018[10.52] †	0.011[7.21] †	0.005[4.61] †	0.005[3.77] †
Foreign Partner	0.231[6.88] †	0.167[3.41] †	0.229[6.96] †	0.225[6.48] †	0.162[3.98] †	0.008[3.14] †	0.007[2.77] †	0.008[3.25] †	0.009[3.60] †	0.009[3.57] †
Founder	0.100[1.82]**	0.041[0.62]	0.097[1.78]**	0.105[2.53] †	0.029[0.58]	-0.015[-7.70] †	-0.012[-5.80] †	-0.015[-7.36] †	-0.007[-3.51] †	-0.007[-3.51] †
Family/ Business Group	0.051[0.70]	0.066[0.97]	0.055[0.75]	0.049[0.78]	0.071[1.10]	-0.007[-3.76] †	-0.009[-4.84] †	-0.007[-3.93] †	-0.014[-8.20] †	-0.014[-8.19] †
Domestic VC	-0.011[-0.25]	-0.084[-1.34]*	-0.017[-0.39]	-0.013[-0.30]	-0.096[-1.80]**	-0.007[-5.14] †	-0.008[-6.18] †	-0.007[-5.10] †	-0.006[-5.12] †	-0.006[-5.16] †
Foreign VC	-0.088[-3.79] †	-0.088[-3.79] †	-0.086[-3.74] †	-0.093[-3.69] †	-0.084[-3.29] †	0.012[8.03] †	0.010[6.10] †	0.012[7.75] †	0.003[1.88]**	0.003[1.93]**
SME Board	-- --	-- --	-- --	-- --	-- --	-- --	-- --	-- --	-- --	-- --
Market Controls										
Price	-0.134[-6.77] †	-0.138[-8.15] †	-0.130[-6.79] †	-0.156[-3.51] †	-0.123[-2.48] †	-0.021[-18.20] †	-0.013[-10.70] †	-0.020[-14.07] †	-0.109[-32.94] †	-0.113[-26.54] †
Volatility	-0.831[-3.07] †	-0.818[-2.93] †	-0.894[-3.24] †	-0.929[-3.70] †	-0.804[-3.00] †	0.414[1.62]*	0.432[1.63]*	0.414[1.62]*	0.423[1.60]*	0.421[1.59]*
Volume	0.005[1.19]	0.010[1.89]**	0.011[1.86]**	-0.014[-0.55]	0.026[0.78]	-0.021[-14.87] †	-0.012[-10.07] †	-0.019[-11.29] †	-0.102[-30.25] †	-0.105[-26.60] †





	South Africa ALT-x (N = 3,724)			Zimbabwe (N = 1,457)			
	Controls	Zero (%)	Liu	Turnover	Overall	Controls	Zero (%)	Liu	Turnover	Overall
Intercept	1.672[19.33] †	1.366[12.53] †	1.649[17.70] †	-0.524[-2.72] †	-0.543[-2.79] †	0.576[6.06] †	0.541[4.39] †	0.458[3.22] †	-0.248[-1.47]*	-0.517[-2.52] †
% Zero Returns		0.002[6.73] †			-4.48E-04[-1.39]*		2.51E-04[0.88]			-2.83E-04[-1.17]
Liu			0.001[0.74]		-2.82E-04[-1.57]*			0.003[1.86]**		-0.009[-2.28]**
Turnover				0.144[13.58] †	0.150[12.20] †				0.054[5.40] †	0.097[4.10] †
Ownership Controls										
State	-- --	-- --	-- --	-- --	-- --	-0.017[-1.56]*	-0.017[-1.57]*	-0.017[-1.55]*	-0.019[-1.68]**	-0.020[-1.85]**
Foreign Partner	-- --	-- --	-- --	-- --	-- --	-0.002[-0.26]	-0.002[-0.31]	-0.003[-0.44]	-0.003[-0.46]	1.95E-04[0.03]
Founder	0.011[1.71]**	0.013[2.16]**	0.012[1.87]**	0.027[4.22] †	0.027[4.20] †	0.089[3.32] †	0.089[3.30] †	0.087[3.21] †	0.074[2.72] †	0.068[2.54] †
Family/ Business Group	-0.049[-6.13] †	-0.037[-4.68] †	-0.048[-6.08] †	-0.020[-2.62] †	-0.022[-3.01] †	0.005[0.53]	0.006[0.55]	0.006[0.64]	0.004[0.40]	-9.49E-05[-0.01]
Domestic VC	-0.037[-6.24] †	-0.034[-5.80] †	-0.037[-6.34] †	-0.041[-7.30] †	-0.041[-7.20] †	0.043[4.37] †	0.044[4.71] †	0.047[5.18] †	0.047[4.79] †	0.038[4.89] †
Foreign VC	0.126[10.90] †	0.134[11.51] †	0.126[10.90] †	0.107[9.25] †	0.104[9.33] †	-- --	-- --	-- --	-- --	-- --
SME Board	-- --	-- --	-- --	-- --	-- --	-- --	-- --	-- --	-- --	-- --
Market Controls										
Price	-0.047[-10.52] †	-0.037[-7.80] †	-0.046[-9.71] †	-0.169[-16.05] †	-0.177[-13.67] †	-0.035[-8.75] †	-0.035[-8.80] †	-0.032[-7.55] †	-0.082[-8.67] †	-0.130[-5.31] †
Volatility	0.216[1.54]*	0.219[1.49]*	0.215[1.53]*	0.221[1.41]*	0.221[1.42]*	0.064[6.64]	0.064[6.64] †	0.064[6.76] †	0.063[7.03] †	0.064[7.10] †
Volume	-0.050[-19.98] †	-0.040[-13.32] †	-0.047[-14.02] †	-0.152[-17.86] †	-0.159[-14.81] †	-0.017[-5.43]	-0.016[-4.44] †	-0.012[-2.27] †	-0.058[-6.53] †	-0.108[-4.04] †
Size	-0.046[-9.03] †	-0.046[-8.85] †	-0.047[-9.18] †	0.096[7.61] †	0.102[7.43] †	-0.018[-4.11] †	-0.017[-3.86] †	-0.017[-3.76] †	0.039[3.44] †	0.083[3.62] †
Adj-R2 (%)	0.4974	0.5065	0.4983	0.5621	0.5624	0.4415	0.4413	0.4427	0.4568	0.4636
Notes:	* p > 90% level; ** p > 95% level; † p > 99% level





Table 5  Likelihood ratio tests


























Notes:	* p > 90% level; ** p > 95% level; † p > 99% level





Table 6  Country-level institutional quality determinants of liquidity and price discovery random effects tests
Country random effects regression coefficients for annual average of monthly liquidity measures on each of the six institutional quality measures for each sample group market. The six institutional quality measures are from the World Bank (World Bank Governance website, 2011) and are defined in terms of construction both on website as well as in Kaufman et al (1999). Liquidity measures are the bid ask spread, the LOT (1999) proportion of zero daily price returns.  The firm liquidity characteristics are price, volume and daily return volatility.  Price and volume are natural log scaled, in line with Stoll (2000). There are 106 observations per regression
Panel 1	Dependent variable:  % Zero Returns (Price Discovery)		
Institutional Quality measure	Corruption Control	Government Effectiveness	Political Stability and Absence from Violence	Regulatory Quality	Rule of Law	Voice & Accountability






Rule of Law					-4.886 [-0.54]	
Voice & Accountability						-1.945 [-0.18]
						
Market Cap.	-10.829 [-3.89] ††	-11.269 [-3.81] ††	-9.950 [-3.73] ††	-10.509 [-3.71] ††	-10.415 [-3.93] ††	-10.647 [-3.86] ††
Traded Volume	-0.440 [-0.30]	-0.548 [-0.37]	-0.316 [-0.19]	-0.455 [-0.29]	-0.157 [-0.09]	-0.17 [-0.09]
Volatility	-0.412 [-0.36]	-0.349 [-0.27]	-0.467 [-0.42]	-0.437 [-0.33]	-0.440 [-0.38]	-0.424 [-0.37]
Price	4.599 [1.72]**	4.889 [1.71]**	4.781 [1.76]**	4.505 [1.69]**	4.223 [1.68]**	4.040 [1.51]*
						
Panel 2	Dependent variable:  Bid-Ask spread				
Intercept	1.476 [5.99] ††	1.477 [6.35] ††	1.348 [5.38] ††	1.461 [5.99] ††	1.396 [5.82] ††	1.307 [5.41] ††
						




Rule of Law					-0.179 [-2.57] ††	
Voice & Accountability						0.019 [0.22]
						
Market Cap.	-0.135 [-4.48] ††	-0.135 [-4.65] ††	-0.124 [-4.08] ††	-0.133 [-4.30] ††	-0.128 [-4.06] ††	-0.120 [-4.09] ††
Traded Volume	-0.009 [-0.63]	-0.010 [-0.67]	-0.010 [-0.72]	-0.010 [-0.65]	-0.004 [-0.23]	-0.014 [-0.98]
Volatility	-0.003 [-0.16]	-0.002 [-0.15]	-0.002 [-0.14]	-0.003 [-0.19]	-0.003 [-0.18]	-0.002 [-0.15]
Price	0.062 [2.50] †	0.060 [2.35] †	0.054 [2.18]**	0.061 [2.25]**	0.061 [2.32] †	0.049 [1.98]**
Notes:	* p > 90% level; ** p > 95% level; † p > 99% level; †† p > 99.95% level





Appendix Table 1.  Summary of secondary market regulations and fees for sample group markets
	Capital Gains Tax	Other Taxes and Fees	Commission
Southern Africa			
South Africa	Exempt	VAT at commission rate 0.5% marketable security. 1.0% stamp dutyInvestor Protection fee: 0.0002%	Main Market:  1.4%, trades < R1,500,000 and 0.21%, trades > R1,500,000Equities main market minimum fee: R7.42 or R8.46(incl. VAT) on both buy and sell legs of a positionClearing and Settlement Fee: 0.0026% Subject to minimum of R2.33 (R2.66 incl. VAT) on buy leg and R9.43 (R10.75 incl. VAT) on sell side leg
ALT-x	Exempt	As South Africa	As South Africa
Namibia	Exempt	As South Africa	As South Africa
South-central Africa		
Zambia	Exempt	15% withholding tax	The current LuSE guide for transacting on the LuSE is 1.375% of the value of the transaction.
Zimbabwe	15%	15% withholding tax	1.73% + US$ 2.00 for stock purchases and 2.41% + US$ 2.00 for corresponding stock sales
Malawi	Exempt	None	Two principal fees: First is a sliding scale of brokerage fees: 2% for MK0 – 50,000; 1.5% for MK 50,000 – MK100,000; 1% for >MK100,000.Second fee is annual safe custody fee of MK400 per security held.
Botswana	Exempt	15% withholding tax	Dealing costs are a percentage of the total consideration on the scale: P0 – P50,000 = 2%, P50,001 – P100,000 = 1.5%, P100,001 and over = 1%Stock Exchange handling fees: P15 per bought note and P10 per sold note
East Africa			
Kenya	Exempt	Withholding Tax on Dividends is 10% for non-residents and 5% for residents. Otherwise no Capital Gains, Stamp Duty, nor VAT	Main Market:  Brokerage commission charged as follows,Trade value < KSh 100,000 fee of 1.80%Trade value > KSh 100,000 fee of 1.50%0.14% of trade value in Kenyan Shillings applied to buy and sell legs.0.01% applied to buy and sell legs for the investment compensation fund.
Mauritius	Exempt	None	Fixed fee of 0.25% by Stock Exchange of Mauritius and 0.05% by Financial Services Commission.  Sliding fee scale for Stockbroking Co and CDS: Transaction Value <R3m (Stockbroker: 0.75%; CDS: 0.20%); Transaction Value >R3m <R6m (Stockbroker: 0.70%; CDS: 0.15%); Transaction Value >R6m <R10m (Stockbroker: 0.60%; CDS: 0.15%); Transaction Value >R10m (Stockbroker: 0.50%; CDS: 0.10%)
West Africa			
Nigeria	10%	10% withholding tax	Commissions and fees are assessed on a sliding scale that is standard across all brokers. For transaction amounts less than N1,000,000 (roughly $6,350.00) there is a 1.86% levy for stock purchase and a 2.19% levy for corresponding sale.  For larger transactions, commissions and fees total 1.49% of the total transaction value to buy and 1.82% of the total transaction value to sell.
BRVM	Exempt	None	Discretion of individual local brokerage firms (SGIs)
Ghana	Exempt	10% withholding tax	Sliding scale of fees from 2.5% for transactions less than 5m ¢ to 1% for those over 500m ¢
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^1	  The Amihud (2002) construct was excluded in later stages of study because of the minimal order flow in many of these markets and its relatively uniform lack of definition
^2	  The Bourse Regionale des Valeurs Mobilieres (BRVM) is a regional stock exchange with a trading floor in Abidjan and a network of licensed brokers, the Societe de Gestion et d'Intermédiation (SGI) spread across the Francophone West African Economic and Monetary Union.  Countries include: Cote d’Ivoire, Benin, Togo, Burkina Faso, Mali, Niger, Senegal and Guinea-Bissau.
^3	  The selection of optimal liquidity measure used a test proposed by Vuong (1989) (see the appendix of Lesmond (2005) for details).
^4	  Following Liu (2006) a deflator of 11,000 is used in constructing estimates for LM1
^5	  Zimbabwe data are particularly sensitive to macroeconomic conditions.  Full dollarization was only achieved in February 2009, and secondary market trading data stabalized from January 2010.
^6	  The governance indicators are available from: http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.asp
^7	  Country-level Spearman’s Rank correlations for price, volatility, traded volume, market capitalization and the liquidity measures are available from the authors on request
^8	  It should be noted that the apparently high levels of venture capital in markets such as Uganda, Tanzania, BRVM and Cape Verde Islands is a function of the low number of listings.
^9	  White cross section robust standard errors and covariances  method has been used in all estimations to account for period clustering over time for either firms or countries/markets
